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1.1 Introduction and background 
Traditionally, the non-pathological incapacity based on provocation has operated to reflect a 
compromise between human frailty and harshness of law in criminal law. The defence 
mitigates the harshness of the law in instances of unpremeditated murder (crimes). This 
position has evolved out of the courts’ concern that killing due to certain frailties is less 
blameworthy than other killings, and equally, less susceptible to the deterrent effects of 
punishment. While in some jurisdictions such as South Africa, the defence can afford the 
accused a complete acquittal, in others, such as Kenya and Canada, it is only a partial defence. 
Nonetheless, the doctrine has evoked intense debate especially among women rights 
advocates and activists for its supposedly profoundly gendered nature.  
Proponents of abolishing and reforming the defence contend that while the defence is 
favourable to men who kill their spouses, it totally ignores the situation of women who kill in 
non-confrontational instances arising from cumulative serious violence and abuse. They 
reason that the society has traditionally institutionalised female subordination through unfair 
practices in law, and as such, the continued application of the defence in its present form, is 
just but an extension of the practice. Most of the criticism directed at the defence emanates 
from the concept of loss of self-control which, in many regimes, is constrained almost 
exclusively to the requirement of the emotion of sudden anger or rage mostly associated with 
men. In consequence, other passions such as fear, despair, compassion, and empathy, that are 
mostly associated with women, and that are manifested in the gradual loss of self-control, are 
disregarded. This, they claim, elevates the position of men and confers upon them an undue 
advantage over women before the law, thereby denying women their right of access to justice. 
Furthermore, the situation is exacerbated by the fact that women who kill in non-
confrontational circumstances rarely succeed when they rely on other defences. To this end, 
focus has been directed towards the reformation of the defence so as to accommodate the 
reality of women who kill in non-confrontational situations, and ultimately, restore gender 
equality in its application. 
This thesis seeks to critically evaluate the aspect of gradual loss of self-control in relation to 
the defence on provocation in instances where women kill in non-confrontational 




despite concerted deliberate attempts through international conventions and domestic 
legislation to ensure that both genders are afforded equal rights before the law. In some 
jurisdictions such as England and Wales (UK) and South Africa, the impetus for change is 
apparent. The research seeks to establish, among other things, the cause of this increased 
scrutiny on the defence in relation to women who kill in non-confrontational situations. 
The research proceeds from the presumption that a reformulated defence of provocation 
would be an appropriate defence for a woman who kills her abuser in a non-confrontational 
circumstance. Accordingly, many important aspects of the study rely heavily on related 
existing literature. The methodology used is a combination of broad literature survey and 
comparative analysis between the legal position in South Africa and Kenya and the position in 
relatively developed legal systems (England and Wales, Australia and Canada). 
1.2 Overview of the chapters 
Chapter One sets out the general tone and the agenda of the thesis through a brief introductory 
overview and breakdown of the chapters. Chapter Two seeks to demystify and understand the 
conduct of the accused woman who kills in non-confrontational circumstances. The section 
attempts to briefly explicate the cause of the accused’s conduct, the nature and extent of the 
various defences available to her and the relevance of the defence of provocation. Chapter 
Three traces the origin of the law of provocation, and thereafter proceeds to illuminate its 
development in South African and Kenyan criminal law. Chapter Four is a follow-up of the 
previous chapter on the origin and development of the law, and focuses on the current 
position and application of the law in the two countries. Chapter Five delves into the grounds 
for reformation of the law with a glimpse of selected jurisdictions outside South Africa and 







Brief Exploratory Insight into the Accused’s Conduct and the Defences available 
2.1  Understanding the Accused 
2.1.1 Conduct of the Accused  
Women who kill in non-confrontational situations present a unique and multifarious position 
in criminal law.1 The same could obviously be said of men who kill in similar circumstances 
especially in same-sex relationships.2 Numerous theories have been espoused to explain the 
cause of the seemingly unwarranted killings and correspondingly, to influence the appropriate 
treatment in law. One such theory and of particular relevance to this thesis is the Battered 
Woman Syndrome (BWS) that seeks to explicate the psychosomatic and behavioural patterns 
presented by a woman who has experienced repeated abuse over a period of time.3The term 
was coined by the respected American psychologist, Dr. Lenore E. Walker to describe the 
victim’s experience of cyclic episodes of violence characterised by distinct periods of tension 
building, acute battering and remorse, forgiveness and affection by the abuser.4The victim is 
bound to the situation by the inability to respond appropriately in what Walker refers to as 
‘learned helplessness’.5Learned helplessness is a consequence of the victim’s genuine love for 
the abuser compounded with individual fears.6Although BWS has been variously dismissed as 
not being accurately reflective of the victim’s reality,7it is nonetheless, submitted that it 
                                                          
1 J Dressler ‘Battered women and sleeping abusers: Some reflections’ (2005) 3 OSJCL 457 at 457 for example, 
refers to ‘non-confrontational homicide’ where the accused unexpectedly kills her victim while he is passive 
(asleep, watching a game or eating). CJ Rosen ‘The excuse of self-defence: Correcting a historical accident 
on behalf of the battered women who kill’ (1986) 36 AULR 11 at 13 contends that such cases present a 
difficult time for the courts and criminal justice officials as it involves sympathetic defendants who cannot 
fairly be blamed for their conduct but who would have no defence if the law was strictly applied. 
2 SB Sorenson & KA Thomas ‘Intimate partner violence in same-sex relationships’ 2009 EJOCFV 1 at 2 note 
that the rates of intimate partner violence (IPV) is higher among gay men and due to societal homophobia, 
the victims’ experiences often go unreported /unnoticed.   
3 LE Walker ‘Who are battered women?’ (1997) 2 JWS 52 at 52 defines a battered woman as a woman who is 
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behaviour by a man in order to coerce her into 
doing what he wants without regard for her rights as an individual. 
4 Ibid 53-54. 
5 Ibid 55. 
6 Walker (n 3 above) 54 notes that the victim’s reasoning is clouded by numerous fears including losing out 
economically, loneliness and death or serious injury in attempt to flee.  
7 JH Krause ‘Distorted reflections of battered women who kill: A response to Professor Dressler’ (2006) 4 
OSJCL 555 at 565 points out that BWS has proven to be extremely problematic as an empirical, cultural and 
political model and is not an accurate portrayal of the reality of the abused woman. See also M Reddi 
‘Battered Woman Syndrome: Some reflections on the utility of this ‘syndrome’ to South African women who 
kill their abusers’ (2005) 18 SAJC 259 at 262 submits that the reality of a battered woman’s reactions vary 




represents a reasonable attempt to explicate the cause for the seemingly unprovoked killings 
and ushered a paradigm shift in approaching such cases.8 
2.1.2 Excuse or Justification? 
A woman’s conduct or actions where she kills in non-confrontational circumstances may 
either be excusable or justifiable. 9  Central to the two concepts is the consideration of 
blameworthiness of the particular act. 10 Justification is inferred from the conduct of the 
accused while excuse focuses on the state of the mind of the actor.11Whereas justifiable 
conduct is objectively assessed in relation to the appropriateness of the act, 12  excusable 
conduct is subjective and relates to the accused’s mental state at the given time.13Grounds for 
justification include private defence, necessity, consent and official capacity.14Conversely, 
insanity, infancy, youth, automatism and provocation are examples of excusable 
grounds.15The general criminal law approach attendant in any jurisdiction is also vital in 
comprehending the nature of the accused’s conduct. For example, the South African criminal 
law system is traditionally associated with psychological approach while the Kenyan criminal 
law pursues the normative theory of fault approach.16 
 
                                                          
8 Reddi (n 7 above) 261 explains that besides explaining the reality of the battered woman, BWS seeks to 
illustrate the dynamics of the abuser or batterer thus putting the entire situation into perspective. At 272 she 
notes that BWS evidence is generally introduced in cases where the woman has killed her abuser in non-
confrontational circumstances. In S v Ferreira (2004) 2 SACR 454 (SCA) at 466i-467b the court noted that 
the theory had been referred to in other jurisdictions to admit evidence relating to self-defence for abused 
women. 
9 L Katz et al Foundations of Law (1999) at 269 generally refers to justifications and excuses as affirmative 
defences comprising claims by the defendant for exculpation. A Simester ‘ On justifications and excuses’ in 
L Zedner & JV Roberts Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Essays in Honour of 
Andrew Ashworth, 95 at 97 makes a distinction between irresponsible (excusable) and rationale-based 
(justifiable) conduct.   
10 KJ Heller ‘Beyond the reasonable man? A sympathetic but critical assessment of the use of subjective 
standards of reasonableness in self-defence and provocation cases’ (1998) 1 AJCL 1 at 10. 
11 Dressler (n 1 above) 463. 
12 Heller (n 10 above) at 10-11 refers to generally acceptable behaviour which is encouraged and tolerated and 
future similar circumstances would provoke similar response or reaction. See Rosen (n 1 above) 18 defines 
justification defences as those that identify objectively determinable external circumstances that render 
otherwise criminal acts acceptable to society. Katz et al (n 9) at 269 refers to the right conduct under the 
specified conditions.    
13 Heller (n 10 above) 11 notes that excusable conduct is ‘personal and limited to the specific individual caught 
in the maelstrom of circumstances.’   
14 CR Snyman Criminal Law (2008) at 103. Other grounds include impossibility, disciplinary chastisement and 
negotiorum gestio. 
15 Simester (n 9 above) 96-97 says that these grounds are predicated on the denial of the accused’s moral 
responsibility and the recognition of her inadequacy or incapacity to process and apply moral reasoning to 
her conduct. 
16 S Goosen ‘Battered women and the requirement of imminence in self-defence’ (2003) 16 PELJ 70 at 99. See 




2.2 Defences Available 
2.2.1  Private Defence 
Accordingly, various defences may be available to a woman who kills in non-confrontational 
circumstances. The accused can plead private defence where she uses reasonable or deadly 
force against the victim. 17 Snyman defines private defence as the use of necessary and 
reasonably proportional force against an attacker to resist an on-going or imminent attack that 
threatens life, bodily integrity, property and/or any other protectable interest.18Private defence 
is assessed objectively with the aim of negating the accused’s conduct. Invariably, since 
battered women present different characteristics, the court will objectively assess the 
reasonableness of the woman’s appraisal regarding the imminence of her perceived 
threat.19Provided all the other conditions relating to the attack and the accused’s conduct have 
been met,20 for the accused to succeed on self-defence, her conduct must be a reasonable 
response to the perceived imminent threat from her perspective.21Moreover, the court will 
have to be satisfied that her conduct is reasonable in relation to the prevailing 
circumstances 22 However, women who kill in non-confrontational circumstances rarely 
succeed when they rely on the defence of self-defence. Obviously, this is occasioned by the 
requirement of immediacy threshold which rarely obtains in non-confrontational 
instances.23Numerous decisions by the courts have served to illustrate the unsuitability of self-
defence in non-confrontational instances and the difficulties exerted on the 
                                                          
17 Reddi (n 7 above) 270.  
18 Snyman (n 14 above) 103. This definition was also embraced by the court in S v Engelbrecht 2005 (2) SACR 
41 W at para 228. See also Reddi (n 7 above) 270 where she points out that a person threatened with 
imminent attack can strike a pre-emptive blow aimed at averting the perceived threat.  
19 Reddi (n 7 above) 270 alludes that a woman’s appraisal of danger may be influenced by her past experiences 
and even where objectively there may be no danger, she may have a unique perception of the danger of the 
situation and its likely outcome based on her previous experiences of abuse and violence.  
20 The accused’s conduct must constitute a necessary reasonable response directed at the attacker against an 
unlawful attack upon a legally protected interest. 
21 Reddi (n 7 above) 271.  
22 The accused must show that at the relevant time, there were no less harmful means available to defend 
herself or her threatened interests and why she was unable to disengage from the abuser or seek external 
assistance. In Ex parte die Minister van Justisie: In re S V Van Wyk 1967 (1) SA 488(A) at 498B held that 
reliance on self-defence may fail in cases of extreme disproportion in the use of force. In S v T 1986 (2) SA 
112 (O) at 129 it was held that in assessing the reasonableness of the accused’s conduct,  the court is guided  
by factors such as the relative size and strength of the parties, gender, age, means available, nature of threat, 
interests threatened and persistence of the threat.  
23 R Bradfield ‘Domestic homicide and the defence of provocation: Tasmanian perspective on the jealous 
husband and the battered wife’ (2000) 19 UTLR 5 at 10 points out that in most instances relating to such 
killings, a woman’s conduct can be construed as vengeful, deliberate and/or premeditated killing. See also 
Goosen (n 16 above) 75 is of the view any measures taken after the attack has ended would be deemed 




accused.24Unsurprisingly, the same position is held and supported by many legal scholars.25It 
has been argued that the behaviour manifested by victims of BWS and indeed any other 
syndrome, is psychological and hence calls for a subjective perspective. Consequently, the 
same cannot be objectively justified.26Nonetheless, there are indications that the courts are 
willing to move away from the rigidity of the traditional test of self-defence which could well 
eventuate into a boon for the victims of BWS as illustrated in the words of Holmes J in S v 
Ntuli:27 
 
South African courts must be careful to avoid the role of armchair critics, wise after the 
event, and weighing the matter in the secluded security of the court-room. The approach 
is that in applying these formulations (the triggering conditions) to flesh and blood facts, 
the courts adopt a robust attitude, not seeking to measure with nice intellectual callipers 
the precise bounds of legitimate self-defence.28 
 
Similarly, in Engelbrecht, the court recognised that self-defence could be available where 
there was an on-going pattern of behaviour suggestive of imminent or inevitable violence.29 
                                                          
24 In Norman v State 1988 (2) 366 (SE) 586-587 for example, the defendant who had been married to the 
diseased for twenty five years had gone through a long history of verbal and physical abuse which was 
disclosed and corroborated by several witnesses. Norman often threatened the defendant in public that he 
would kill her or cause grievous bodily harm on her person. On the fateful day, Norman decided to take an 
afternoon nap. The defendant went to her mother’s place and found a gun. She went back home and shot 
Norman to death. At the trial, she unsuccessfully asserted that the killing was an act of self-defence. The 
court held that as matter of law, the sleeping victim did not present the threshold of imminent threat. In 
Engelbrecht (n 18 above) the court held that the accused who had killed her husband while he was asleep, 
could not avoid liability by relying on self-defence because there was no attack pending upon her or her 
daughter. 
25 Dressler (n 1 above) 457 for example, refers to non-confrontational ‘self-defence’ homicide as morally 
unjustifiable. See also Krause (n 7 above) 558 postulates that the chief obstacle in a non-confrontational 
situation is proving that the threat was imminent in the absence of any on-going attack. Goosen (n 16 above) 
75 is of the view that the requirement that the attack must have commenced or must be on-going is 
problematic, as battered women tend to kill in instances where their abuser is asleep or incapacitated and 
there is no imminent threat of harm.  
26 Dressler (n 1 above) 463. The syndrome seeks to explain why the actor should be treated differently than 
others and not blame her when we would blame others who commit the same act. See also M Reddi 
‘Domestic violence and women who kill: Private defence or private vengeance’ (2007) 124 SALJ 22 at 25 
points out that it would be difficult for a battered woman who has responded to a threat of harm from her 
own perception to be viewed as having acted reasonably. 
27 1975 (1) SA 429 (A). 
28 Ibid 437e. 
29 Engelbrecht (n 18 above) para 391-397. The court followed the Canadian case R v Lavalle 1990 (55) CCC 
(3d) at para 348 where it was held that requiring a systematically abused woman to wait until the 
commencement of an attack to defend herself is tantamount to sentencing her to murder by instalment, and at 
349 that the requirement of imminence should be extended to situations of inevitable abuse where patterns or 




2.2.2 Putative Private Defence 
An accused woman who intentionally kills in non-confrontational circumstances whilst under 
an honest but mistaken belief that she is entitled by the law to kill in such circumstances may 
raise the defence of putative private defence which, unlike private defence, is evaluated 
subjectively.30  The accused will be required to show that she did not have the requisite 
intention to act unlawfully and as such, was acting under a genuine albeit mistaken belief. It is 
immaterial whether her actions are rational or not. However, the accused may not inevitably 
escape liability and will most probably be found guilty for culpable homicide arising from 
negligence. 31 The extra-ordinary circumstances of a battered woman, when assessed 
objectively, can be used to prove incapability on her part to foresee that her conduct would be 




In some cases the accused’s conduct can be ascribed to post-traumatic stress caused by her 
past experiences which may be exhibited in the form of sane automatism. If she kills her 
passive abuser in such a state she can be deemed as having acted involuntarily and 
consequently criminal liability would not attach.33The onus is on the prosecution to prove 
otherwise but the accused has to establish a factual ground that is sufficient to cast doubt on 
the voluntariness of her actions.34Therefore, in order to controvert the assumption that the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
403 (A) at 406c where it was held that in applying objective standards, one must decide what the fictitious 
reasonable man, in the position of the accused and in light of all the circumstances, would have done.  The 
reasoning is further augmented by Goosen (n 16 above) 76 where he is of the view that a ‘legal convictions’ 
test approach informed by the fundamental values of the Constitution, namely, human dignity, equality and 
freedom would guide to evaluate the particular circumstances of the accused in line with s 9 of the 
Constitution.  
30 Reddi (n 7 above) 275. In S v De Oliviera 1993(2) SACR 59 (A) at 631 held that the defence is applicable 
where the accused honestly believes that his life is in danger even though, when objectively viewed, this is 
not the case. 
31 Ibid 275.  
32 Ibid 276.  
33 Reddi (n 7 above) 276 refers to sane automatism as a term used to indicate that the condition of automatism 
is not caused by mental pathology (mental disease or defect).  
34 S v Humphreys 2013 (2) SACR 1 (SCA) at para 11 in confirmation of the criterion laid out in S v Cunningham 
1986 (1) SACR 631 (A) at 635B and 635I to establish the presence or otherwise of automatism. Scott J 
defined factual foundation as medical evidence of an expert nature which is necessary to displace the natural 
inference that an accused had acted voluntarily or consciously. The court is guided by the expert evidence, 
other facts of the case and the accused’s own actions in the intervening period. The same had previously been 
underlined in the case of S v Trickett 1973 (3) SA 526 (T) at 537D where Marais J concluded that to 




accused did not act voluntarily, evidence of expert nature will have to be adduced in addition 
to the accused’s own account or evidence of the circumstances at the material time.  
 
2.2.4 Provocation 
An accused woman who kills in non-confrontational circumstances may plead lack of 
criminal capacity resulting from non-pathological causes. The accused can introduce evidence 
to show that she was acting under a temporary and relatively brief episode of emotional upset 
arising from intoxication, emotional stress or provocation. Snyman defines non-pathological 
criminal incapacity as the inability of the accused to channel her conduct to accord with his 
insight into right or wrong while under a brief spell of emotional disturbance induced by some 
external force.35Non-pathological incapacity as manifested in the form of loss of self-control 
and emotional stress36will only be successful if the accused adequately demonstrates that she 
lacked the capacity to appreciate and/or act in accordance with such appreciation arising from 
non-mental illness.37Where provocation38 is relied on as a defence, it has been generally 
accepted in a majority of cases that the onus lies with the state to prove accused’s criminal 
capacity beyond reasonable doubt by ousting absence of such provocation.39For the accused 
to rebut the presumption of capacity, she will be required to lay a factual foundation in her 
defence and in the absence of sufficient evidence to cast doubt on her capacity, will be found 
to possess criminal capacity.40As held in S v Cunningham,41in the absence of exceptional 
circumstances, a sane person who engages in criminal conduct is presumed to do so 
voluntarily and consciously.42 It is trite law that the court is seized with the ultimate decision 
upon consideration of all the evidence before it.43 However, it is generally accepted that 
                                                                                                                                                                       
doubt as to the voluntary nature of the act and medical or other expert evidence to preclude presence of 
mental illness or disorder. See also Snyman (n 14 above) 57. 
35 Snyman (n 14 above) 163. 
36 CR Snyman ‘The tension between legal theory and policy considerations in the general principles of criminal 
law’ (2003) AJ 1 at 21 is of the opinion that emotional stress and provocation, like cause and effect, are 
merely flipsides of the same coin. Emotional stress can be in the form of emotional storm, emotional 
collapse, shock, fear, panic and tension. 
37 In terms of s 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
38 Snyman (n 36 above) 12 defines provocation as aggressive conduct by the accused triggered by the victim’s 
insulting or provocative behaviour. 
39 For example in S v Lesch 1983 (1) SA 814 (0) at 823A; S v Arnold 1985 (3) SA 256 (C) at 264H-I; S v 
Campher 1987 (2) SA 940 (A) at 264H-I at 958J-959A; S v Wiid 1990 (1) SACR 561 (A) at 564b-e.  
40 S Hoctor ‘A peregrination through the law of provocation’ in Joubert (ed) Essays in honour of CR Snyman 
(2008) 110 at 129.  
41 1986 (1) SACR 631 (A). 
42 Hoctor (n 40 above) 129. 
43 Ibid 129. The court will take into cognizance the expert evidence and all the other facts of the case including 
the accused’s reliability as a witness and her conduct at the relevant time. See also FFW Van Oosten ‘Non-




psychiatric or psychological evidence, although not binding on the court,44is valuable for 
laying out the accused’s factual foundation.45Provocation has the effect of procuring acquittal, 
excluding intention, operating as a ground of mitigation of punishment 46 and confirming 
presence of intention.47 
2.2.5 Diminished Capacity 
Where the accused can demonstrate that her criminal capacity has been affected by the 
victim’s provocative conduct, or repressed emotional stress induced by the victim’s conduct, 
she can plead diminished responsibility. 48 Diminished responsibility is an individualised 
concession and compromise between law and psychoanalysis which serves as mitigating 
factor during sentencing by taking into cognizance of the social and emotional pressures 
bearing upon the accused at the time of her unlawful conduct.49An essential requirement is 
that the accused must have acted immediately and within the heat of the moment.50Some 
commentators have argued, however, that although diminished responsibility serves as a 
useful tool to enable the battered woman to escape a conviction of murder, it nonetheless has 
the effect of stereotyping her as mentally incapacitated.51Nevertheless, South African criminal 




                                                                                                                                                                       
that the court of itself has the discretion, on the basis of the accepted facts, to decide whether the defence 
raised has sufficient evidence. 
44 S v Laubscber 1988 (1) SA 163 (A) at 172C-G; S v Calitz 1990 (1) SACR 119 (A) at 127a-d; S v Shivute 
1991 (1) SACR 656 (Nm) at 665c-e where it was ruled that psychiatric or psychological evidence concerning 
a non-pathological condition does not fulfil an indispensable function despite the fact that expert evidence 
was put before the court in all the three cases. 
45 S v Campher (n 39 above) 966J-967C; S v Wiid (n 39 above) 564e-f. 
46 Snyman (n 14 above) 241. See also Van Oosten (n 43 above) 140 where he notes that provocation can 
negative voluntariness of an act, criminal capacity and criminal intention.  
47 Snyman (n 14 above) 242. In S v Lesch (n 39) at 826A it was held in casu that provocation had not excluded 
but contributed to the intention. 
48 Hoctor (n 40 above) 130. He defines diminished responsibility as diminished capacity of the accused to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of her conduct or act in accordance with the appreciation of its wrongfulness at 
that particular time.   
49 A Norrie Crime, Reason and History (A critical introduction to criminal law) (2001) at 191. See also Hoctor 
(n 40 above) 130 lists the social and emotional pressures to include prolonged periods of sustained and 
mounting mental strain, heightened tension, considerable stress, extreme provocation, intoxication and 
emotional stress.  
50 Hoctor (n 40 above) 130. 
51  For example, Norrie (n 49 above) 191. 
52 S 78(7) provides that if the court finds that the accused at the time of the commission of the act was 
criminally responsible for the act, but that his capacity to appreciate its wrongfulness or to act in accordance 
with such an appreciation of its wrongfulness was diminished by reason of mental illness or defect, the court 




Why the Defence of Provocation? 
The defence of provocation echoes a compromise between the value we attach to human life 
and the society’s interest for self-preservation through maintenance of law and 
order.53Customarily, and over time, the courts have regarded provocation as recognition of 
human weakness and, accordingly, killing arising from certain human frailties is to be 
perceived less blameworthy than, and treated differently from, other forms of killing. This is 
especially significant when the provocative conduct of the victim is brought into the 
equation.54Similarly, it has been contended that certain groups of people are predisposed by 
the society to intensely provocative situations.55Accordingly the inability or ineffectiveness of 
the society to remove or resolve the reality of such people inevitably leads to killings.56The 
defence of provocation therefore serves as a concession to the individuals in the society who 
are overwhelmed by fervently provocative conditions. In this regard emphasis is on the 
corrective feature of the defence of provocation by seeking to cure social ills that play on 
human frailty.57The discourse for the need to avail defence of provocation to the accused who 
kills as a result of pent-up emotions is further vindicated by the general trend of the law in the 
various criminal law jurisdictions and the unsuitability of the other defences such as private 
defence. 58 In South Africa, courts have already recognised that emotional stress and 
provocation can lead to a condition of non-pathological incapacity.59Proceeding from the 
above, it is submitted that it would not be confounding to discern the proximate relationship 
between the conduct of the woman who kills in a non-confrontational situation and the 
defence of provocation. 
 
  
                                                          
53 J Greene ‘A provocation defence for battered women who kill’ (1989) 12 ALR 145 at 145 is of the opinion 
that the defence of provocation is a consequence of the competing values and interests within the society and 
has a substantial effect on the accused.  
54 Ibid 145 argues that the provocative conduct of the victim tips the scales in favour of the provoked killer.  
55 Ibid 146 gives an example of victims of domestic violence who suffer directly at the hands of their abusers 
and indirectly from the society’s indifference to their plight. 
56 Ibid 146. 
57 Ibid 148 for example, battered women who kill can collectively and continuously demand the concession of 
provocation defence until the society effectively resolves the problem of pervasive domestic violence.   
58 Many jurisdictions are reviewing their laws to conform to emerging legal issues. This will be the subject of 
discussion in chapter four. 




CHAPTER 3  
Historical Background and the Development of the Defence of Provocation 
3.1 Historical Background 
3.1.1    Roman Context 
Under the Roman law, a precursor to the contemporary conception of criminal law whereby 
punishment for unlawful behaviour is meted out by public authority may be the Twelve 
Tables of 450 BC.60By 200 BC attendant criminal law included the domestic jurisdiction of 
the paterfamilias,61 private criminal actions, exercise of tresviri capitales (minor magistrates 
with police functions) and the trials before comitias (assemblies of people). Then later in 149 
BC a permanent court of senators, the quaestiones perpetuae,62 was created upon the passage 
of the lex Calpurnia which was instituted to deal with both compensation and punishment.63 
The establishment of the Roman Empire (the Principate) is attributed to gradual 
disappearance of the quaestiones perpetuae and crimes could now be brought before officials 
who included the Emperor, the Urban Prefect and the senators. For example, by 4 BC the 
Senate was dealing with non-capital offences. 64 Indeed the senate is credited with the 
development of the interpretation of the leges publicae which were used to setup the 
quaestiones perpetuae.65It seems that the exercise of public authority in the administration of 
criminal law really gained impetus under the Principate and it is within this era that a set of 
laws creating offences and the prescribed punishment were decreed.66This served as the 
foundation of the Roman substantive crimes which subsequently came to be known as 
‘crimina publica’ and later ‘criminal extraordinaria’.67Much of the knowledge we have on 
Roman law is greatly attributed to the grand efforts of Emperor Justinian68who decreed the 
collection and collation of the numerous scattered Roman legal texts into one compilation 
                                                          
60 S Hoctor ‘Tracing the origins of the defence of non-pathological incapacity in South African law’ (2011) 17 
Fundamina 70 at 71. The partly penal and partly compensatory rules were delictual in nature with a penal 
character to punish the wrongdoer.  
61 A paterfamilias was the senior ascendant male in a family. All his descendants through his sons were in his 
paternal power as long as he lived and he had powers of life and death over them. He also had the only 
proprietary capacity in the group. 
62 Quaestio originally referred to a commission of inquiry and when convened ad hoc, could be described as 
extraordinaria. Quaestiones perpetuae was in the normal sense of the term a permanent jury court. 
63 OF Robinson The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome (1995) at 1. 
64 Ibid 6-7. 
65 Ibid 9. 
66 Hoctor (n 60 above) 71. 
67 Ibid 71 notes that ‘Crimina publica’ and ‘crimina extraordinaria’ may be classified together, as opposed to 
‘delicta’ (privata). ‘Criminal publica’ comprised offences regulated by leges while ‘crimina extraordinaria’ 
comprised offences regulated by an imperial decree. Conversely, ‘delicta’ comprised delicts or torts. 




which came to be known as Corpus iuris civilis.69Through the influence of Italian jurists 
known as Glossators and Commentators, the Justinian collation spread to the whole of 
Western Europe and in the middle of the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries reached the 
Netherlands and consequently, the blend between the local customary law and the received 
Roman law gave rise to Roman-Dutch law.70 
 
3.1.2 English Context 
During the early English medieval times murder was viewed as an extremely abhorrent crime 
often subject to ‘lex talionis’.71However towards the twelfth century during the Anglo-Saxon 
era, there was a clear shift towards drawing a distinction between the various forms of 
homicide.72Nonetheless the presumption was that acts of murder were only actuated through 
malitia praecogitata (malice) and where express evidence was lacking, it was implied that the 
death was a direct consequence of the accused’s wickedness of the mind. The strict 
interpretation of conduct resulting in murder was due to deficient policing systems and the 
fact that any crime was perceived to be an affront to the divine authority of the king.73In the 
thirteenth century royal prerogative extended capital punishment to all felonious killings. 
Accordingly, only de gratia (royal pardon of grace) could save the accused from 
                                                          
69 Snyman (n 14 above) 6. The Corpus iuris civilis comprised four parts namely the Institutiones, the Digesta or 
Pandectae, the Codex and the Novellae . See also Hoctor (n 60 above) 71-72 notes that Corpus iuris civilis is 
broad authority for all the currently recognised common-law crimes in South African criminal law. However, 
the principal sources of information regarding Roman criminal law are the so-called ‘libri terribiles’.  
70 Snyman (n 14 above) 6.  Hoctor (n 60 above) 72 attributes the rediscovery of Roman law as the work of the 
Glossators, who wrote short explanatory notes or ‘glossae’ on words or phrases of the Justinianic texts 
although they did not advance the development of criminal law as their explanations of the Roman texts 
made no reference to the customs and statutes of the time. However a more significant role in the 
development of the criminal law was played by the Commentators (or post- Glossators), who wrote longer 
notes or commentaries on the Justinianic texts seeking to systematise these and to link them with the 
prevailing statutory, customary and canon law. 
71 EO Isedonmwen ‘A requiem for provocation?’ (1988) 32 JAL 194 at 195. NH Frijda ‘The Lex Talionis: On 
vengeance’ in Der Poll & Sergeant JA (ed) Essays on emotion Theory (2009) at 263 contends that the 
concept of lex talionis is driven by the passionate human desire for vengeance or private vindication. At 264 
notes that it was based on the Law of Talion (i.e. an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth) and greatly 
contributed to concept of  lawfulness.   
72 J Horder Provocation and Responsibility (1992) at 6 notes that killings by stealth were capital offences as 
opposed to other forms of killings which could be cured through compensation to the deceased’s kin. 
73 Isedonmwen (n 71 above) 195.  G Burges ‘ The divine right of kings reconsidered’  (1992) 107 (425) TEHR 
837 at 837 notes that the authority of the monarchy was absolute and God given and quotes an excerpt of a 
speech by King James I to the Lords of Commons on 21st March 1609‘Monarchy is supreme on earth and 
kings are God’s lieutenants on earth […]’. Similarly, it was worth noting that ‘devils of the mind and stigma 




execution.74Consistent with this new development was the categorization of non-felonious 
homicides into justifiable and excusable killings. Justifiable homicide such as slaying a 
fleeing outlaw did not attract any punishment. On the contrary, excusable homicide 
comprising homicides se defendendo (killing in self-defence) and homicides per infortunium 
(accidental killing) did not lead to exoneration of the killer.75Even so, persons convicted of 
excusable homicide were favoured with lenient treatment and were subject to automatic grant 
of de cursu (royal pardon).76A perceptible progenitor to provocation in the sixteenth century 
was the practice of chance medley77as the society gradually started to tolerate the notion that 
killing under certain circumstances could be vindicated.78Chance medleys were manifested in 
sudden brawls which were exacerbated by the practice of wearing side arms, incessant 
breaches of honour and the frenzy that attended to such brawls. The inevitable outcome of 
such affrays, especially where arms were involved was death. Although chance medley did 
not per se afford the accused the shelter of self-defence, the confusion generated therefrom 
implied difficulty in assessing the malitia praecogitata with regard to those who killed and, as 
such, policy consideration dictated that their actions were excusable. Accordingly, such 
killings attracted the less lenient punishment of forfeiture of property and compensation of the 
victim’s dependants under the direction of the clergy. 79 Thus, the courts begun viewing 
killings arising from the melees as less blameworthy from other forms of killings as 
exemplified in the words of Lord Goddard CJ in R v Semini : 
 
Where the killing was the outcome of a quarrel or fight, it excusable though not 
justifiable, if the killer had not begun but had taken part in the fight, or having begun it he 
endeavoured to decline any further struggle and retreated, but, being closely pressed, 
killed his antagonist to avoid himself being maimed or killed.80 
 
                                                          
74 Horder (n 72 above) 6. De gratia took precedence over penitence to the deceased’s kin for killings committed 
through malitia praecogitata. 
75 Horder (n 72 above) 6. See also BJ Brown ‘The demise of Chance Medley and the recognition of provocation 
as a defence to murder in English law?’ (1963) 7 (4) AJLH 310 at 310.  
76 Ibid 6. 
77 Brown (n 75 above) 310. 
78 J Horder ‘The duel and the English law of homicide’ (1992) 12 (3) OJLS 419 at 424 defines chance medley 
as ‘an unlawful killing that came about through a chance encounter with the victim, whether the killing was 
intentional or not […]’ Previously, at 420-421 he distinguishes between sudden encounter (justifiable 
homicide) and combatting where both parties consent to a duel under the auspices of self-appointed experts 
and subscribing to informal rules (code duello).  
79 Brown (n 75 above) 310 – 312. 




The compromise position adopted by the courts as a direct consequence of the difficulty of 
proof associated with incidents of chance medley is what gave rise to provocation.81The 
nature of the killing obscured existence of praecogitata malitia with the result that the 
accused’s unjustifiable conduct could not be construed as murder and could only be clarified 
from the nature of provocation. Nevertheless, there was unprecedented acceptance of 
provocation especially upon the abolition of chance medley in 1828 due to the steady decline 
of the customary adorning of side-arms in public and the passing of the Statute of Stabbing by 
King James 1 in 1604.82The place of provocation as the new applicable law and the death 
knell for chance medley was put to rest in R v Semini where Lord Goddard CJ held that 
chance medley which could afford the accused an exemption from corporal punishment was 
no longer applicable since its abolishment.83 
At this juncture the test for provocation was very painstakingly rigid and could only be 
countenanced as being adequate to take away a reasonable man’s ability of his self-control 
only where the killing arose from finding one’s spouse in flagrante delicto with 
another,84proportionate retaliation upon a physical attack85and extreme verbal provocation.86 
The defence of provocation was finally confirmed by the enactment of s 3 of the Homicide 
Act of 1957 which provided that: - 
 
Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person 
charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to 
lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a 
reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in determining 
that question the jury shall take into account everything both done and said according to 
the effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man. 
  
                                                          
81 Brown (n 75 above) 313. 
82 Ibid 313-314. The statute of Stabbing made it a non-clergyable offence to strike or thrust any person who had 
not acted in the first instance and had the effect of reducing murder to manslaughter. It came to be closely 
associated with provocation and subsequently judicially extended to include use of firearms and other blunt 
weapons was intended on controlling outrages by persons of inflammable temperament. 
83 R v Semini (n 80 above) 407. 
84 Holmes v DPP 1946 AC 48 at 498. 
85 Mancini v DPP 1942 AC 1 at 9. 




3.2  The Development of Defence of Provocation 
3.2.1 The case of South Africa 
The Roman-Dutch law was introduced into the Cape region of South Africa in 1652 by Dutch 
settlers who set up the Dutch East India Company (DEIC). Upon the advent of British 
colonisation of the Cape, the new powers did not interfere with the established Roman-Dutch 
law although English influence was noticeable, especially with regard to criminal law 
taxonomy. However, English law took precedence in the subsequent years preceding the 
Union of South Africa in 1910 due to numerous difficulties experienced with the Roman-
Dutch law. The other provinces followed suit of the practice in Cape and consequently, a 
hybrid system drawn from both English law and Roman-Dutch law was formed.87 
Under the Roman law, homicide was dispensed with largely under lex cornelia de sicariis as a 
means of curbing infractions and maintaining the peace.88Nonetheless, anger was viewed as 
an extenuating basis for mitigation with distinction been made between proposito 
(premeditated crimes) and impetus (unpremeditated crimes), and increasingly there were 
indications that it could function as a complete defence albeit sporadically89Indeed passion 
could be a plea for defence and a factor of consideration to reduce the punishment although it 
did not affect the accused’s liability.90Although the South African criminal Law is modelled 
largely along the Roman and Roman-Dutch law, seemingly in practice, the courts initially 
deliberately embraced the English law of provocation.91 Section 141 of the Native Territories 
                                                          
87 Hoctor (n 60 above) 73 highlights the problems that gave English law dominance over Roman-Dutch law as 
unfamiliarity with Dutch or Latin amongst practitioners, difficulty in accessing old authorities, uncertainty 
and lack of uniformity in writings of the Dutch jurists and the Rigid nature of the Roman-Dutch law which 
had ceased evolving in the Netherlands since 1809 with the introduction of the Napoleonic Code Penal which 
was introduced into the Netherlands in 1811. 
88 Robinson (n 63 above) 41. At 43 ‘ The lex Cornelia inflicts the penalty of deportation on anyone who kills a 
man or carries a weapon for theftuous purposes, and on anyone who possesses, sells, or prepares poison for 
the purpose of killing a man, or who gives false witness whereby someone dies or death is brought about. For 
all these crimes it is agreed that the penalty of death should be imposed on the better classes, but the lower 
classes are crucified or thrown to the beasts. A murderer is someone who kills a man with any sort of 
weapon, or brings about a death’.     
89 Hoctor (n 40 above) 111-112. 
90 Robinson (n 63 above) 21 notes, for example, that a man who killed his wife upon catching her in adultery 
was generally accepted to have mitigating circumstances to plead. See also Hoctor (n 40 above) 112 adds that 
Roman-Dutch writers regarded anger as a factor mitigating punishment only where the anger was justified 
and not a ground for excluding capacity. See also J Burchell ‘A provocative response to subjectivity in the 
criminal law’ (2003) AJ 23 at  24 also points out that Roman and Roman-Dutch Law did not regard anger , 
jealousy or other emotions as an excuse for any criminal conduct but only as factors which might mitigate 
punishment only if such emotions were justified by provocation. For further reading on the same see Hoctor 
(n 60 above) 74. 
91 Hoctor (n 40 above) 113 notes that the position of South African courts was influenced by the need to 




Penal Code (NTPC) served as the apt avenue through which to hand down a verdict of 
culpable homicide as opposed to murder where the circumstances suggested that the killing 
was less blameworthy.92It can thus be contended that at this juncture the test for provocation 
was greatly influenced by policy considerations and, as such, objective in nature.93This was 
tailed by a period of inconsistency as the courts vacillated between objective and subjective 
tests of inquiry as demonstrated in the succeeding cases.94Despite the axiomatic lack of clarity 
as to the position of the courts with regard to provocation, there was a strong drive towards 
establishing the subjective (principle) approach as the established test. For example, in the 
case of R v Tenganyika95 the court favoured a two-tier evaluation of the accused involving 
both subjective and objective assessments with a resultant conviction of at least culpable 
homicide. However, in subsequent judgments the subjective inclination was apparent.96A 
contemporaneous development at the time was the increased scrutiny on the concept of 
criminal capacity which was brought to prominence by the Rumpff Commission of Inquiry 
                                                                                                                                                                       
provisions for extenuating circumstances. Under the English ‘specific intent’ approach, crimes requiring 
‘specific intent’ could be negated by factors such as provocation or intoxication resulting in convictions for 
less serious crimes for which a lesser form of mens rea was required. See also Burchell (n 90 above) 25 
contends that the courts adopted the position after the introduction of the death penalty for murder in 1917.   
92 Hoctor (n 40 above) 113. In R v Butelezi 1925 AD at 160 it was held, as per Solomon JA, that the NTPC (aka 
Transkeian Penal Code) correctly set the applicable law in South Africa on the subject. For additional insight 
on NTPC (Act 24 of 1886 of the Cape) see Snyman (n 14 above) 8. See also Burchell (n 90 above) 25 where 
he is of the view that under the influence of NTPC South African Courts adopted a position that provocation 
could never be a complete defence to killing and at most it could only be a partial defence.   
93 Hoctor (n 40 above) 113-114 submits that at this stage the inquiry into provocation generally invoked the test 
of the ‘reasonable man’ and was consistent with the test of intention flowing from the English common law 
presumption that a person was presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of his actions. 
Snyman (n 36 above) 12 defines the approach as ‘Policy approach’ where the inquiry is not limited to the 
accused’s state of mind but goes further and also takes objective factors into consideration. He contends that 
the objective factor in this instance encapsulates the important pragmatic view that law expects people to 
control their temper. This is in contrast to the ‘Theoretical approach’ which is a pure derivative of legal 
theory and does not countenance the practical demands of the criminal justice. The inquiry here is purely 
subjective and limited to the accused’s state of mind at the crucial moment. He is of the view that a 
subjective approach can in certain extreme cases lead to provocation operating as a complete defence which 
can result in acquittal of the accused.   
94 In R v Thibani 1949 (4) SA 720 (A) at 731 the subjective undertone was discernible as Shreiner JA held that 
provocation had assumed its proper place as a special kind of tool for establishing intent and the act beyond 
reasonable doubt. In R v Kennedy 1951 (4) SA 431 (A) the appellate division conversely adopted the 
objective approach in entirety. Similarly, in R v Molako 1954 (3) SA 777 (0) at 781 B-G although the court 
exhibited slightly cautious support for subjective assessment for provocation, it was nonetheless quick to 
underscore the significance of the presumption that a sane person is responsible for the consequences of his 
actions. 
95 1958 (3) SA 7 (FSC). The first stage would involve a subjective inquiry to determine whether the accused 
had ‘intent to kill’ which could result in either acquittal or culpable homicide while the second stage required 
an objective assessment as to whether a reasonable person in the circumstances of the accused would have 
lost his self-control, which could also result in culpable homicide despite the accused having ‘intent to kill’. 
96 The subjective approach was evident in S v Dlodlo 1966 (2) SA 401 (A), S v Delport 1968 (1) PH H172 (A) 
and S v Mokonto 1971 (2) SA 319 (A). The ruling in S v Mokonto was especially significant as it heralded the 
preclusion of s 141 of the NTPC from South African criminal law through the court’s rejection of the code’s 




into Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters of 1967 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Rumpff report). The report created a novel model for evaluating criminal 
capacity based on cognitive and conative elements97which greatly influenced the provisions of 
s 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.98These provisions were initially envisioned for matters 
related to mental illness but were subsequently used by the courts to infer the test of non-
pathological incapacity. The Commission also recognized affective mental functions relating 
to a person’s emotional state, though in its view they were not relevant to criminal liability, 
especially where there was a finding of both cognitive and conative elements in the accused 
conduct.99However, a finding of strong emotional disturbances could negate the accused’s 
cognitive capacity and by extension, criminal capacity.100 
Centred on the theoretical foundations of the Rumpff report, there was gradual recognition 
and development of defence of non-pathological incapacity in ensuing court decisions. The 
tone for the trend was set in the case S v Chretien whereby the court held that voluntary 
intoxication could negative criminal liability. 101 Subsequently, and amidst the prevailing 
tension between policy and principle considerations with regard to the question of 
provocation or emotional stress, the courts’ inclination to adopt the defence of non-
pathological incapacity was evident.102Unsurprisingly therefore, in S v Vuuren, the court 
accepted the defence was available where the accused’s conduct stemmed from intoxication 
in combination with other factors such as provocation and emotional stress.103In the same 
year, the approach taken in S v Chretien104 was confirmed in S v Lesch.105Thus the principle 
that a purely mental assessment can be used to ascertain criminal incapacity in the absence of 
a biological condition was established.106 
                                                          
97 The report made a recommendation for the inclusion of assessment of both cognitive and conative functions 
in the legal test for criminal capacity. Hoctor (n 40 above) 118 defines cognitive capacity as the presence of 
adequate insight into one’s conduct and conative capacity as the ability to control such conduct. 
98 Act No. 51 of 1977. 
99 Hoctor (n 40 above) 119. 
100 Ibid 120. 
101 1981 (1) SA 1097 (A) at 1104E-H & 1106. 
102 Van Oosten (n 43 above) 136. He observes that following the decision in S v Chretien, policy consideration 
seems to have carried the day as the legislature intervened to reverse the decision through the enactment of 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988 See also Burchell (n 90 above) 23 where he is of the view that 
tension between descriptive and normative rules in the criminal is more apparent pronounced in the attitude 
of the courts to the predicament of a killing occasioned by provocation.  
103 1983 (1) SA 12 (A) at 17G-H. 
104 S v Chretien (n 101 above). 
105S v Lesch (n 39 above) 825A-826A. The court agreed that provocation can negative voluntariness of an act, 
criminal intention and criminal capacity rendering the accused incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of 
his or her conduct. 




However, it was not until the case of S v Arnold that provocation prevailed as a complete 
defence. In that case it was held that the evidence of provocation raised by the accused had 
led to the deduction that the accused who had been charged with murder and was relying on 
the defence of non-pathological incapacity, lacked criminal capacity and consequently, was 
acquitted.107In the subsequent case of S v Campher108the conviction of murder by the court a 
quo was upheld, but the court in a majority statement, reiterated that indeed the defence of 
non-pathological incapacity existed and that the provisions of s 78 of Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977 were relevant for its assessment.109The case for the defence was further augmented 
in the case of S v Laubsher110whereby the court developed a theoretical framework for 
establishing the tests for both cognitive and conative capacities111 and subsequently, in S v 
Wiid,112it obtained appellate endorsement.  
 
  
                                                          
107 S v Arnold (n 39 above). 
108 S v Campher (n 39 above). 
109 At 954F and 965H respectively, Viljoen JA held that s 78 extended to non-pathological factors. At 955B-C it 
appears he confirmed  his  reasoning on the matter as in the previous case of S v Adams 1986 (4) SA 882 (A) 
at 900C-E holding that the fundamental principles of criminal incapacity should apply irrespective of what 
caused the accused's mental disturbance or emotional upheaval and whether the accused's aberration was 
temporary or permanent. In concurrence, Boschoff AJA held that criminal capacity could also apply in the 
case of temporary clouding of the mind. 
110 S v Laubsher (n 44 above). 
111 Ibid 166G-167A.  




3.2.2 The case of Kenya 
British imperialism has long been attributed for the rapid evolution of the modern legal 
systems and the widespread application of the English common law.113 The expansion of the 
British Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries resulted in the transplantation of the 
English common law in most parts of the globe. Accordingly, criminal law in Kenya and by 
extension, the law of provocation, like in many other countries which endured the influence of 
British colonial reign, is a direct derivative of the English Common law heritage. 114The 
English common law was introduced to Kenya through the East African Order-in-Council of 
1897.115Prior to that there was no clear distinction between criminal and civil matters and 
correspondingly, punishment of the offender and compensation of victim were intimately 
intertwined. However, with the advent of colonial rule a new dispensation of criminal law was 
ushered and acts such as murder, rape and theft which were hitherto considered merely a 
preserve of the disputing parties, were taken over by the state in order to preserve the social 
order.116As the empire grew in stature and size, the Colonial Office through the Colonial 
Legal Service deemed it appropriate to align the procedural and the penal laws of the colonies 
to as nearly as that in force in England in order to enhance administrative efficiency. 
Accordingly, the use of the Indian codes was withdrawn in many colonial dependencies 
where they had previously been applied. But the potent was equally manifest as some of the 
received laws became inapplicable compelling the Colonial Office to accord each dependency 
with its own unique code.117 
The law of provocation was introduced into Kenya through the Colonial Office Model Code 
(COMC) in 1930 replacing the Indian Penal Code (IPC) of 1860. The COMC was itself 
modelled largely along the Queensland Criminal Code of 1899 which had been preceded by 
the English Criminal Code of 1880.118Under the IPC, the defence of provocation could be 
construed from the provisions of s 38 which provided that ‘Persons concerned in a criminal 
act may be guilty of different offences. Where several persons are engaged or concerned in 
                                                          
113 This is the part of English law that is not the result of legislation. It originated from the customs of the 
English people and was justified and developed by the decisions and rulings of the courts. 
114 SF Joireman ‘The evolution of the common law: Legal development in Kenya and India’ (2006) 44 (2) CCC 
190 at 190-191.  
115 W Musyoka Criminal Law  (2013) at 19. 
116 JJ Collingwood Criminal Law in East Africa and Central Africa (1967) at 2. 
117 AN Doorly ‘British magistrates in East and West Africa’ (1945) 3 (27) 3 SCLIL 87 at 90. In Kenya, the 
Indian Penal Code had been in operation since 1897 when Kenya became a British protectorate and was 
replaced by the Penal Code of 1930. 




the commission of a criminal act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that 
act.’ 
Accordingly, where one killed another arising from an intensely provocative situation, the 
killing could only result in a conviction of culpable homicide and murder. Nevertheless, 
provocation was an example of a law which had to be adapted to the local customs in Kenya 
(East Africa). For example, the definition was modified to include ‘any wrongful insult’ over 
and above the traditional English law requirement of just ‘any wrongful act’. This was clearly 
aimed at placating the local customs where verbal insults were highly admonished, and could 
easily eventuate into conflicts. Another notable departure from the English law with regard to 
the law of provocation was the omission of the requirement that the accused’s conduct be 
reasonable in relation to the nature of the provocation. Understandably, it was an indication of 
the Colonial Office’s recognition that the concept of appropriateness was alien to the local 
systems and would be a source of more difficulties as opposed to providing the desired legal 
cure. Indeed, it has been noted that courts often reduced convictions for murder to 
manslaughter even where they found that the retaliatory conduct of the accused was 
disproportionate to the provocation. 119 Thus in the case of an educated African man, 
reasonableness of his conduct was to be assessed against what the average uneducated tribal 
villager might have done in the circumstances and not against what the average Englishman 
would have done.120Likewise, sudden discovery of adultery (in the absence of the act) could 
amount to provocation 121and prior knowledge was immaterial. 122 Under the English law, 
provocation as a defence would not have been available to a man who killed a woman who 
had cohabited with him for a long time, on finding her in flagrante delicto with another man 
unless he had been lawfully married to the woman.123But in the Kenyan (East African) 
context this was allowed irrespective of the nature of their relationship. 124 The need to 
contextualize the application of the law of provocation was captured in the words of H. 
Grattan Bushe:-  
 
                                                          
119 JS Read ‘Criminal law in Africa of today and tomorrow’ (1963) 7 JAL 5 at 9. 
120 Kasumbwe v R 1944 RNCA 116 at 119. The test is that of an ordinary reasonable person of the class to which 
the accused belongs. 
121 Chacha s/o Wamburu v R 20 EACA 339. This was a departure from the English rule that adultery per se is 
not provocation unless the deceased is caught in flagrante delicto. See Greyson v R 1961 RN 337 (FSC) and 
Manyeni s/o Mukonko v R 21 EACA 274. 
122 Lokora s/o Omeri v R 1960 EA 323 (CA). 
123 See for example, R v Greening 1913 (3) KB 846. 




Where provocation is in question, especially for the purpose of deciding whether the 
crime committed is murder or manslaughter, the standard, when you are trying a Native, 
should not be the standard of the ordinary Englishman, but of the Native.125 
 
Be that as it may, the codes in most dependencies bore close similarity to each other although 
they were not identical. For the most part the penal codes were modelled along the common 
law of England. Similarly, the criminal procedure codes were a semblance of the practice and 
procedure observed in English Courts and in instances where the English law was found 
wanting, the difficulty was aptly resolved using the provisions of the Indian criminal 
procedure. Consequently, a common feature of criminal in most British colonies including 
Kenya was the fusion of English and Indian procedural law.126 
Upon independence in 1963, Kenya domesticated the former British legal system, along with 
the COMC which became the Kenyan penal code127to date. It is noteworthy that although 
after independence, law reform in East Africa and Kenya began drifting towards a unified 
criminal process where all criminal cases were to be handled under a common criminal code; 
there hasn’t been a perceptible jurisprudential departure from the pre-independence 
dispensation. Indeed the only remarkable variation was the codification of most of the English 
common law offences.128 This can be attributed largely to the principle of legality or nullum 
                                                          
125 HG Bushe ‘Criminal justice in East Africa’ (1935) 34 (135) JRAS 117 at 127 in a presentation to the Royal 
African Society on the state of criminal justice in East Africa. This reasoning was supported by the courts for 
example, in Rex v Yonasani Egalu and others R 1942 (9) EACA 65 it was held (as per Webb CJ, Wilson J and 
McRoberts J) that where a local ordinance designed to suit the circumstances of the people of East Africa 
deals completely with a matter and differs from the English law, it must be construed in its application free 
from any glosses derived from any expositions from English law.   
126 Doorly (n 117 above) 90. 
127 Penal Code 81 of 1948. Aspects related to provocation will be discussed in detail in chapter 3. 
128 The 1930 Penal Code was replaced by the current 1948 Penal Code in an attempt to bring all criminal 
offences under a single regime and most of the laws that had been contextualised on African set-ups were 
reversed back to English common law in the new Code. However, many offences still remained unlegislated. 
For example, customary criminal law was recognised and applied through African or native courts. Criminal 
offences which prosecuted under this law included adultery, fornication, rape, unnatural sexual behaviour, 
incest, assault, theft, arson trespass, damage to property and practising witchcraft. The coming into force of 
the independence Constitution completely excluded the African criminal on account of the fact that 
customary law was unwritten and hence inconsistent with s 77(8) of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the 
English common law influence remained and s 3 of the 1948 Penal Code, provided that the Code was to be 
interpreted in accordance with the principles obtaining in England and the terms used in the Code were 
presumed to be used with the meaning attaching to them in English criminal law and were tobe construed in 
accordance with the English law (repealed in 2003 through the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act No. 5 of 
2003). This strong attachment of English common law to Kenyan and East African criminal law can be seen 
in Uganda v Mbulimbuli 1975 HCB 225 where, as per Ssekandi Ag. J, the court held that the Ugandan 
equivalent of s 208 of the Penal Code on the defence of provocation is an accurate codification of the English 




crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege as embodied in s 77(8) of the post-independence 
Constitution.129By dint of this principle all criminal offences are defined in legislation thereby 
excluding common law offences. 
                                                          





The Present Law 
4.1 The case of South Africa 
Although much of the development of the law of provocation in South Africa is to be found at 
common law, it is settled law that the provisions of s 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act are 
applicable.130The section provides that:  
 
A person who commits an act which constitutes an offence and who at the time of such 
commission or omission suffers from a mental illness or mental defect which makes him 
or her incapable- 
  (a) of appreciating the wrongfulness of his or her act or omission; or  
(b) of acting in accordance with an appreciation of the wrongfulness of his or 
her act or omission, shall not be criminally responsible for such act or 
omission. 
 
Accordingly, the test for the defence involves a two-legged inquiry. In the first instance, 
inquiry into the ability to differentiate between right and wrong (or the cognitive or mental 
component), and secondly, inquiry into the ability to control oneself in accordance with such 
discernment (also referred to as the physical or conative component).131Absence of one of the 
two capacities would therefore result in the accused lacking criminal capacity. Equally 
incontestable is the fact that the defence has progressively developed to gain unparalleled 
endorsement by the courts. 132 However, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) brought a 
different albeit contentious perspective in the momentous judgement of S v Eadie133which 
traversed through a repertoire of erstwhile judgements in the development of the defence and 
                                                          
130 The provisions that were initially intended for pathological defences were extended to cover non-pathological 
defences such as intoxication, emotional stress and provocation. The position has found resonance with 
numerous court decisions (for example, S v Campher (n 39 above), S v Adams 1986 (4) SA 882 (A) and S v 
Eadie 2002 (1) SACR 663 (SCA)) and legal scholars (for example see R Louw ‘S v Eadie: The end of the 
road for the defence of provocation’ SACJ (2003) 16 200 at 200, Hoctor (n 40 above) 119). 
131 The second leg deals with the concept of self-control. Louw (n 130 above) 201. 
132 The exponential growth is buttressed by willingness of the courts to entertain the notion of non-pathological 
incapacity especially in the 1980s and 1990s with resultant acquittals in three high court decisions viz S v 
Arnold (n 39 above), S v Nursingh 1995 (2) SACR 331 (D), S v Moses 1996 (1) SACR 701 (C) and one 
supreme court of appeal ruling viz S v Wiid (n 39 above). 




a host of numerous standpoints of various legal scholars. Drawing from previous 
judgments134the court reaffirmed that the onus of rebutting a defence of temporary non-
pathological criminal incapacity by the accused lay on the state and that:  
 
(i) in discharging the onus the State is assisted by the natural inference that in the absence 
of exceptional circumstances a sane person who engages in conduct which would 
ordinarily give rise to criminal liability, does so consciously and voluntarily; 
(ii) an accused person who raises such a defence is required to lay a foundation for it, 
sufficient at least to create a reasonable doubt on the point; 
(iii) evidence in support of such a defence must be carefully scrutinised; 
(iv) it is for the Court to decide the question of the accused’s criminal capacity, having 
regard to the expert evidence and all the facts of the case, including the nature of the 
accused’s actions during the relevant period.135 
 
The SCA, ostensibly in an attempt to induce clarity regarding the application of the defence, 
as per Navsa JA, set the following criteria:136 
a. For the accused to escape liability on the basis of the defence the evidence adduced 
regarding the conative or physical leg of the test should be such that it draws an 
inference that the accused’s conduct was involuntary.137 
b. Courts must be careful when dealing with the defence and only in exceptional 
circumstances should the natural inference that people act consciously and 
voluntarily be disturbed. A person has a free choice to succumb to or resist 
temptation. Where one succumbs, he or she must face the consequences of his or her 
conduct.138 
c. Sane automatism is synonymous with non-pathological incapacity due to emotional 
stress and provocation. Thus, where the cognitive leg is established, the accused 
would have to successfully raise involuntariness as a defence in the second leg. 
                                                          
134 S v Calitz  (n 44 above) 126 H-127 C; S v Wiid  (n 39 above) 564B–G; S v Potgieter  1994 (1) SACR 61 (A) 
at 72J–73H; S v Cunningham  (n 34 above) 635I-636C; S v Francis  1999 (1) SACR 650 (SCA) at 652C–H. 
135 S v Eadie (n 130 above) para 2. 
136 Over and above the requirements of paragraph 2. 
137 S v Eadie (n 130 above) para 42 and 57. 




Consequently, an in-depth recall of events militates against a claim of loss of self-
control.139 
d. For the State to succeed in its cause, it must prove that the accused acted consciously 
in a goal-directed manner.140 
e. The conditions relating to the commission of the offence, or the undesired conduct of 
the deceased, or the victim, should rightly be considered as mitigating factors during 
sentencing.141 
f. Courts should not be quick to accept the accused’s ipse dexit regarding his or her 
state mind. The accused’s conduct should also be assessed against the court’s 
experience of human behaviour and social interaction.142 
Remarkably enough, the judgment introduced an element of objectivity into the inquiry of the 
defence. This was yet another example of the simmering consternation between theoretical 
approach (subjectivism) and policy approach (objectivism) in South African criminal law.143 
The introduction of the defence in the first instance was regarded as a conquest for the 
theoretical approach to provocation.144However, the judgment by Navsa JA in S v Eadie 
appears to have elevated the policy approach in relation to provocation thereby effectively 
terminating the hitherto purely theoretical approach.145This approach seems to have been 
enthused by the SCA’s desire to ensure that courts approach the accused’s case premised on 
permissible inferences from objective facts and circumstances.146The pragmatic approach was 
also evident in the earlier case of S v Kensley147 where Van Den Heever JA held: 
 
Criminal law for purposes of conviction - sentence may well be a different  matter- 
constitutes a set of norms applicable to sane adult members of society in general, not 
                                                          
139 Ibid 44 and 57. At para 53 it was held that the second leg should read to mean that looking into all the 
circumstances of the case, the accused could not resist or refrain from the act or was unable to control himself 
or herself to the extent of refraining from committing the act. 
140 Ibid 58. 
141 Ibid 61. 
142 Ibid64. 
143 Snyman (n 36 above) 2, 11 and 12 alludes that this tension between theory and practical demands of criminal 
justice is particularly evident in the law’s treatment of the defence of provocation. At 14, he notes that the 
tension between the two considerations is very evident in the judgement. See also Van Oosten (n 43 above) 
36 where the same tension was observed in S v Chretien (n 101 above). 
144 Snyman (n 36 above) 13. 
145 Ibid 14. At para 64 S v Eadie (n 130 above), Navsa JA admits that critics would describe the position taken 
by the court as yielding to principle.  
146 The court’s insistence on this approach is noticeable through most of the judgement, for example, at para 43 
and 58. 




different norms depending on the personality of the offender. Then virtue would be 
punished and indiscipline rewarded: the short-tempered man absolved for the lack of self-
control required of his more restrained brother. As a matter of self-preservation society 
expects its members, even when under the influence of alcohol, to keep their emotions 
sufficiently in check to avoid harming others and the requirement is a realistic one since 
experience teaches that people normally do.148 
 
Although the approach has been criticised, it has nonetheless, been interpreted as an 
indication of the imminent inclination of criminal law as South Africa confronts emerging 
crime issues.149The judgment is equally notable for equating the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity with that of sane automatism.150This in essence means that where the accused, as a 
result of provocation, relies on the defence, the court should treat the defence as no more than 
that of sane automatism. While some scholars concur with judgement’s position,151others 
have been highly critical.152Nevertheless, this had the effect, as is discernible throughout the 
judgment, of raising the bar where the accused raises the defence.153 
 
Strikingly enough, from the judgement, Navsa JA was not forthright as to the actual position 
of the defence of non-pathological incapacity in South African criminal law.  Whereas some 
excerpts in the judgment suggest that the defence is still part of the law,154 others indicate the 
                                                          
148 Ibid 658G-I. 
149 Snyman (n 36 above) 22 is of the view that the judgment in Eadie marks a turning point that might herald a 
long-awaited reintroduction of more objective considerations, thereby ensuring a better balance between 
subjectivity and objectivity in the construction of criminal liability which would be most beneficial for the 
law. See also Louw (n 130 above) 206 where he is of the view that the judgement may be a hint at a swing 
towards a more normative approach in South African criminal law heralded by public sentiment aghast at the 
country's alarming crime rate.  
150 S v Eadie (n 130 above) para 57.  
151 Louw (n 130 above) 202 for example, is the opinion that was decisive and dealt with the question in a simple 
and logical way. 
152 Snyman (n 36 above) 15-19. 
153 Louw ( n 130 above) 204 alludes that it is more of a general rule than an exception as it is only in one case, S 
v Wiid, that the defence succeeded in the Appellate Division. He further notes that in S v Eadie (para 13, 14 
and 15), both psychologists and psychiatrists were in agreement that it was a rarity for the accused to be so 
provoked as to act involuntarily. Captivatingly enough, at 205-206, he is of the opinion that the problem 
canbe resolved by restructuring the test of the defence. He recommends an inquiry into the physical test in 
the first instance followed by an inquiry into the mental capacity of the accused. 
154 S v Eadie (n 130 above) para 3: '[…] I will consider whether the boundaries of the defence in question have 
been inappropriately extended […]', at para 42: '[…] it is clear that in order for an accused to escape liability 
on the basis of non-pathological criminal incapacity he has to adduce evidence […]', at para 57: 'I am, 
however, not persuaded that the second leg of the test […] should fall away', at para 64: '[…] the greater part 
of the problem lies in the misapplication of the test', and at para 65: 'It is predictable that accused persons will 




contrary.155In the absence of an explicit expression abolishing the defence in the judgment, it 
is submitted that the defence still exists.156Nonetheless, the judgment had the twin effect of 
raising the threshold for its application, and constricting its scope.157 
Beyond the controversies surrounding the judgement by Navsa JA, it is submitted that 
provocation law in South African criminal law is a trend-setter. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the development of this law has been referred to as ‘revolutionary trend’. It is even more 
spectacular given that, unlike in many other jurisdictions, the defence has successfully 
afforded the accused a complete defence. Indeed, as evidenced in the case of S v Wiid,158the 
current law in South Africa is responsive to the realities of the accused woman who kills in a 
non-confrontational situation. Equally notable was the implicit distinction in S v Eadie, 
between pent-up provocation or emotional stress and a sudden flare-up of temper. From the 
judgement it is discernible that courts ought to be more condoning to instances of gradual 
disintegration of powers of self-control as opposed to sudden flare-up of temper. Thus an 
accused who kills as a result of sudden flare-up of temper faces more scrutiny from the court 
through a sequence of inferential reasoning on the credibility of his evidence.   
For the time being, the courts are to be guided by the wisdom of the SCA in accordance with 
the judgement of S v Eadie. However, taking into cognizance the fact that law must constantly 
mutate to accommodate emerging issues, it is submitted that the judgment should not elicit 
denunciation as the position is destined to evolve.159The judgement is just but an element in 
the continuum of growth of criminal law in South Africa. The development of the defence 
over the years is a testament to that.   
                                                          
155 Ibid para 51, for instance, Navsa JA assumes that provocation can only be a factor mitigating punishment, 
and not an exculpatory ground.  At para 60 and 61 the dicta of the court amount to saying that if an accused 
alleges that because of provocation he was so emotionally distressed that he should not be convicted, his 
defence in fact amounts to one of automatism. The implication is that the accused cannot rely on provocation 
in the guise of non-pathological criminal incapacity. 
156 Snyman (n 36 above) 20-21 is of the opinion that considered as a whole, the judgment cannot be interpreted 
as abolishing this defence in toto. If the Supreme Court of Appeal wished to abolish the defence, it would 
have said so clearly. See also Hoctor (n 60 above) 81. 
157 S v Eadie (n 130 above) para 43, 44, 53, 57, 58 and 70. See also Hoctor (n 60 above) 81. 
158 S v Wiid (n 39 above). In this case, the psychiatric evidence was to the effect that given the accused’s intake 
of sedatives and alcohol and lack of eating, combined with the severe assault inflicted by the deceased and 
threat of death after the accused discovered that her husband was having another extramarital affair, the 
accused may well have lacked criminal capacity altogether and may not have been able to distinguish 
between right and wrong. The trial court held that it may have reasonably been possible that the accused may 
have been concussed after the assault and during the time she fired the fatal shots, thus accounting for the fact 
that she could not remember pulling the trigger of the pistol. The Appellate Division clearly emphasized that 
where a foundation for the defence of temporary non-pathological incapacity is laid, the State bears the 
burden of disproving this defence beyond reasonable doubt. Here the State was held not to have discharged 
this burden, and the defence of temporary non-pathological incapacity succeeded. 
159 Louw (n 130 above) 203 supports the mutability character of law by saying that the principles of liability 




4.2 The case of Kenya 
In Kenya, codified provisions on the law of provocation are to be found in chapter nineteen 
(murder and manslaughter) of the Penal Code 81 of 1948.160S 207 of the Act provides more 
specifically that the accused is guilty of manslaughter only where his unlawful conduct, 
resulting in the killing of another, is occasioned by provocation.161Provocation is defined as: 
 
Any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be likely, when done to an ordinary 
person or in the presence of an ordinary person to another person who is under his 
immediate care, or to whom he stands in a conjugal, parental, filial or fraternal relation, or 
in the relation of master or servant, to deprive him of the power of self-control and to 
induce him to commit an assault of the kind which the person charged committed upon 
the person by whom the act or insult is done or offered.162 
 
The section further provides that: 
a. Provocation exists where the accused assaults another in defence of a third person 
with whom he shares a special relationship.163 
b. In a matter relating to assault, a lawful act done on the accused is not a ground for 
provocation.164 
c. An act by a third person on the accused which arises from the conduct of another 
person induced by the accused to incite the said third person to do the act on the 
accused, is not a basis for provocation in a case relating to assault.165 
According to the Act, manslaughter differs from murder in two aspects. Firstly, for a killing to 
amount to murder there must be malice aforethought whereas manslaughter is a consequence 
of an unlawful conduct resulting in death.166Malice aforethought exists where it is proved that 
there was: 
                                                          
160 Chapter 63 of the Laws of Kenya revised in 2012. 
161 The proviso to the section provides killing from provocation is distinct from murder where the act resulting 
in death is in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation before there is time for the passion to cool. 
162 Penal Code 81 of 1948 at s 208(1). 
163 Ibid 208 (2). The nature of the special relationship is as expounded in the definition of provocation in s 208 
(1). 
164 Ibid 208 (3). 
165 Ibid 208 (4). 





a. Intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm; or 
b. knowledge that the conduct in question is likely to cause death or grievous 
bodily harm; or  
c. intent to commit a felony; or 
d. intention to facilitate the flight or escape from custody of any person.167 
 
Secondly, the penalty prescribed for murder is death168while manslaughter attracts a sentence 
of life imprisonment.169Therefore, manslaughter is a residual offence of murder in the absence 
of malice aforethought. 
Although the ultimate decision as to whether there is sufficient provocation rests with the 
court upon consideration of all the facts of the case, in line with the code, the defence will 
only be available to the accused when the stipulated ingredients are proved to exist.170Firstly, 
it must be shown that the killing was done in the heat of passion and without time for it to 
cool. Thus, it has been held that provocation would not be available as a defence where the 
accused kills another arising from the conduct of the deceased several days prior.171Secondly, 
the provocation must be sudden. Hence, where the accused knew of his wife’s infidelity and 
later killed her after she threatened to leave him, it was held that the wife’s conduct did not 
amount to sudden provocation.172Thirdly, the provocative conduct must comprise an unlawful 
act in order to give rise to a legal provocation. Unlawful acts which have been held to amount 
to provocation include killing of the accused’s relative,173an attack on the accused’s wife or 
relative,174trespass to property,175a verbal insult of gross nature,176flagrante delicto,177and 
                                                          
167 Ibid 206. S 202(2) provides that unlawful is conduct amounting to culpable negligence to discharge a duty 
tending to the preservation of life or health, whether such omission is or is not accompanied by an intention 
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176 R v Itima s/o Birigenda 15 EACA 154. 




witchcraft.178Fourthly, the provocation must be such as to deprive an ordinary person of the 
class to which the accused belongs of his power of self-control. The court is able to draw an 
inference based on the facts of the case.179Finally, the provocative act must be done in the 
presence of the accused,180either towards the accused or towards a person who has a specific 
relationship with the accused.181 
According to s 207 of the Act, provocation is primarily a partial defence to 
murder.182However, its application has been extended to instances of assault, specifically 
resulting in grievous bodily harm, where the accused pleads provocation.183Although it would 
appear that the applicable law on provocation is wholly set out in the code, and clearly not in 
need of further interpretation, it is provided that where a question is not expressly provided 
for in the Code, it shall be determined in accordance to the principles of English criminal law 
and this explains the use of common law case law.184It is noteworthy however, that the 
majority of the case laws indicate that only men rely on the defence of provocation.185In the 
few instances where women have relied on the defence, it has rather been misplaced and 
ineffective as demonstrated in the case of RC v R.186The issue raised in the case was whether 
the defence of provocation was available to the appellant in the circumstances of the case. On 
the onset, the court was quick to point out that, since the codification of the criminal law in 
1948, courts had not dealt with any matter with a semblance of circumstances to the instant 
case. In this case, the appellant, a domestic worker, had been charged and convicted of murder 
by the trial court. The appellant had given evidence that the deceased was aggressive and 
abusive causing her to lose her self-control, upon which she strangled the deceased to death. It 
was held that the appellant had the presence of mind to tighten the string to kill the deceased, 
she had the presence of mind to conceal the string, and she had the presence of mind to 
conceal the trail of her conduct by lying about the whereabouts of the deceased. Accordingly, 
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the appeal was dismissed. Nonetheless, the strict interpretation of the statute is still evident 
even in recent judgements. For example, in the case of R v Genya Mwavuo Nyawa,187the 
accused had gone to the bush to cut some building frames, and his wife had left to look after 
their cattle and goats. While leaving the bush he spotted his animals with others not belonging 
to him. On approaching the animals he found the deceased in flagrante delicto with his wife. 
Engulfed in blind rage, he pursued the deceased and killed him using a machete. Held that the 
fact that the love affair between the accused’s wife and the deceased was common knowledge 
did not displace the fact that the accused was provoked and acted in the heat of passion before 
there was any time for his anger to die down. He was acquitted of the charge of murder and 
instead convicted of the offence of manslaughter. 
The wording of the provisions relating to provocation also presupposes that the framers had in 
mind the accused’s gender through the specific use of the pronouns such as ‘his’, ‘he’ and 
‘him’, to the exclusion of the other gender.188Clearly, there has been no significant departure 
from the traditional application of the defence in the Kenyan courts. It would appear, at least 
for now that the courts are not eager to exercise their judicial discretion, and would rather 
conveniently sit behind the shroud of the legality clause. Indubitably, the current law does not 
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Grounds for Reform 
5.1 Conventional and Constitutional Persuasion 
The global community’s concern regarding certain rights and duties for individuals and non-
state actors has spurred a renaissance for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of individuals. 189 The trend is noticeable both under the general 190 and 
regional 191 rules of international law. Both forms of international rules are customarily 
founded on similar principles.192However, the general recognition that states do not retain an 
absolute jurisdiction over their citizenry on matters of human rights is significant. Indeed, it is 
now a requirement under international law that all individuals are protected irrespective of 
their political, socio-economic, cultural or geographical disposition.193Accordingly, attempts 
have been made through numerous international instruments to articulate and guarantee 
equality (and gender equality). 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948provides that all human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.194It further states that everyone is entitled to all 
rights and freedoms provided in the charter without discrimination of sex.195The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966provides for non-discrimination and 
further stipulates that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection 
of the law.196Section 18 (3) of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) 
of 1986calls for all member states to ensure the elimination of every form of discrimination 
against women and protection of their rights. The same provisions have been captured in most 
national statutes buttressing the strong global attention aimed at eliminating discrimination 
against women. The Constitutions of South Africa and Kenya expressly guarantee equality 
and freedom from discrimination.197They also provide that both gender(men and women) are 
equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.198It is 
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instructive therefore, that the law, and by extension provocation law, in the two countries 
conform to the dictates of the Constitution and international law. For example, in South 
Africa, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
(PEPUDA),199gives effect to section 9 of the Constitution so as to prevent and prohibit unfair 
discrimination and promote equality. 200  Similarly, in Kenya, the ideals of equality are 
articulated in the National Gender and Equality Commission Act of 2011.201 
 
5.1.2  Standard of equality 
It is necessary therefore to address this concept of equality as envisioned in the aforesaid 
instruments. In law, the notion of equality espouses a prescriptive function. Prescriptive 
equality seeks to prescribe treatment for conditions which based on a specified standard, are 
perceived to be unequal. In contrast, descriptive equality is merely concerned with the 
perceptible disparities as between comparisons. It is restricted to a descriptive standard. 
Prescriptive equality therefore goes beyond descriptive equality to equalise circumstances 
based on a prescribed standard.202Under s 1 of PEPUDA, equality is defined to include ‘the 
full and equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms as contemplated in the Constitution and 
includes de jure and de facto equality and also equality of outcomes.’ The National Gender 
and Equality Commission Act of 2011 provides for gender mainstreaming which is defined 
as: 
 
Ensuring that the concerns of women and men form an integral dimension of the design 
of all policies, laws and administrative procedures including budgeting and budget 
implementation, and the monitoring and evaluation of programmes implementing such 
policies, laws and administrative procedures in all political, economic and societal 
spheres; so as to ensure that women and men benefit equally, and that inequality is not 
perpetuated.203 
 
Further afield, the United Kingdom Equality Act of 2010 provides that: 
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 An authority to which this section applies must, when making decisions of a strategic 
nature about how to exercise its functions, have due regard to the desirability of 
exercising them in a way that is designed to reduce the inequalities of outcome which 
result from socio-economic disadvantage.204 
 
In order to understand the concept of equality as stipulated in the three Acts, it would be 
necessary to analyse the causal theoretical underpinnings. Globally, there has been a gradual 
move towards deliberate state action aimed at taking positive steps and measures to eliminate 
discrimination, as opposed to the traditional and rather reactive role of simply prohibiting 
discrimination. This development has been occasioned by the increased acceptance of 
substantive equality over formal equality.205 An in-depth analysis of the two concepts would 
suffice at this juncture. 
 
5.1.2.1 Formal equality 
Formal equality is principally concerned with prohibition of unlawful discrimination.206This 
model of equality centres on the individual as the subject for justice, and holds that in the 
absence of a reasonable justification, individuals in similar circumstances should be treated 
alike and conversely, those in dissimilar situations should be treated differently.207It is status 
based and informed by the principle of equal treatment. The focus of this form of equality was 
aptly expressed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the case of A v Commission208 
where it was held ‘The principle of equal treatment is breached when two categories of 
persons whose factual and legal circumstances disclose no essential differences are treated 
differently or where situations are different are treated in an identical manner.’ 
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The model completely rejects forms of positive action involving the use of criteria such as 
race and gender as a rationalisation for privileged treatment. 209  Therefore, under formal 
gender equality, where both genders are in similar circumstances or engaged in the same 
conduct, they are both subjected to identical legal rules.210The principle has attracted repeated 
criticism emanating from its inherent limitations particularly its inability to effectively 
manage institutional and structural forms of discrimination which are detrimental to defined 
groups. The inadequacies of the model are attributed to several factors:  
a. The question of the choice of the comparator is difficult and contentious as the 
comparator is the focal determinant as to whether or not a given fact has occasioned 
inequality. On this basis therefore, formal equality becomes a product of assimilation 
based on assumption of compliance to a given standard.211 
b. The principle of formal equality is rigid and only concerned with negative 
obligations of non-discrimination to the exclusion of other obligations that regulate 
institutional structures in recognition of the fact that varied circumstances need to be 
addressed differently.212 
c. Formal equality does not seek to address entrenched discrimination as it is 
exceedingly contingent on individual justice as a means of enforcing the right to 
equality. Accordingly, the individual victim of discrimination is only vindicated 
upon a successful claim.213 
This formal approach to equality was manifest in much of ECJ’s gender equality 
jurisprudence. For example in Stadt Lengerich v Helmig 214  where a group of part-time 
employees (mostly female) sought to be paid overtime pay although they had not surpassed 
the normal working hours for the full-time employees, it was held that there was no 
discrimination since the pay was pegged on the number of hours worked. The court’s decision 
was criticized for failing to reflect on the implication added hours would have had on the part-
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210 C Forell ‘Gender equality, social values and provocation law in the United States, Canada and Australia’ 
(2006) 14 AUJGSPL 27 at 29. She opines that this approach to equality is problematic when used to justify 
the retention of certain laws and expanding their application to the detriment of either gender. 
211 McHugh (n 206 above) 33. A comparator is a person in similar circumstances but not falling within the 
alleged ground of discrimination, whom the courts uses to assess whether the complainant did indeed receive 
unequal treatment. For example, in a claim for unequal pay based on gender, the appropriate comparator is a 
person of the opposite sex doing same or like work. 
212 Ibid.  
213 Ibid 34 refers to formal equality as the symmetrical or formal approach. 




time workers.215Nonetheless, it has been pointed out that the equality of treatment is an 
effective means of breaking down typecasting grounded on gender.216 
 
5.1.2.2 Substantive equality 
Substantive equality entails positive measures by the state upon an appraisal of the entirety of 
a situation with special emphasis on the context and intervening variances. It seeks to enhance 
social inclusion and redistributive justice by redressing inequalities based on opportunities 
and outcomes occasioned by the differences.217It confers an obligation on all arms of the state 
to move beyond formal equality through application of positive actions.218 Positive action 
involves use of specific measures to actively guarantee enhanced equality.219 It is founded on 
the recognition that equal treatment is not a panacea for varying situations hence the need for 
a proactive approach.220 
Substantive equality is also referred to as the group justice model because it seeks to address 
discrimination afflicting individuals as members of a specified group due to structural 
inadequacies and embedded forms of disadvantages.221It seeks to accommodate the diverse 
needs and realities of disadvantaged individuals towards the attainment of equal human 
dignity and full enjoyment of benefits associated with membership to a given group. Hence, 
with regard to gender equality, this approach would require that law be cognisant and 
responsive to the varied effect a given rule would have on both genders when clustered 
together.222Most substantive equality models comprise two elements, namely, equality of 
opportunity and equality of results. 
5.1.2.2.1 Equality of opportunity 
Equality of opportunity approach involves the application of special measures for the 
disadvantaged category to level the playing ground. It seeks to ensure that all the actors, 
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including members of a particular group, proceed from an equal position unconstrained by 
concomitant disadvantages.223 
 
5.1.2.2.2 Equality of results (outcomes) 
Equality of outcomes adapts a redistributive posture to equal treatment aimed at levelling the 
outcome of a process. It goes beyond the application of special measures to achieve equality 
of opportunities. Examples may include setting obligations to observe composition in 
accordance with diversity or positive obligation to uphold equality. It is contentious as it 
counteracts the principle of equal treatment by applying arbitrary factors.224It remains a 
contentious subject since it seeks to embed the very differences that traditional anti-
discrimination laws, and in this case the formal equality approach, attempt to 
disregard.225Moreover, as it introduces notions of economic inequality and the attendant 
restructuring, it presents pecuniary implications. However, the courts approach the question of 
substantive equality in two ways. Firstly, by deferring to the state where financial difficulties 
hinder the realisation of equality obligations; and secondly, by taking positive steps through 
legal concepts and judicial processes to ensconce separation of powers and institutional 
competences.226Furthermore, the Bill of Rights as enshrined in many a Constitution, has 
tremendously reinforced the recognition of substantive equality as a constitutional right and 
the growth of related jurisprudence founded on context and difference.227 
 
5.1.2.2.3 Application of substantive equality on the defence of provocation 
Application of substantive equality on the defence of provocation would imply that the law 
recognises the prevailing gendered reality, that and accordingly, the grounds upon which the 
defence of provocation is relied on are sex-segregated. This suggests that the accused’s 
conduct is to be predicated upon the conduct associated with the gender to which the accused 
belongs. It calls for consideration of all factors including affective functions, leading to the 
accused’s conduct beyond the traditional factors of rage and jealousy. The law would then be 
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required to be cognisant to the predicament of the battered woman who kills out of fear or 
desperation, and of the man who kills in the heat of passion. Substantive gender equality 
would therefore mean that the law recognises that men and women are different and when 
they kill arising from provocation, they do so in varying contexts. 228  This approach is 
noticeable in many jurisdictions such as South Africa and Australia. The application of 
substantive equality on the law of provocation would also imply the slackening or total 
exclusion of the traditional requirements of the defence. It has been an insistent contention 
that some of these requirements such as ‘there was no time to cool between the provocation 
and the killing’, ‘suddenness’ and ‘presence of triggering instances’ tend to favour certain 
groups while ignoring the realities of others. Varying or removing these traditional 
requirements would invariably allow for the defence to be applicable in different settings. 
Such restructuring would allow the law to be effectively responsive to the myriad of 
rationales on which the defence is grounded. This would disregard the limited application of 
the defence to a particular set of circumstances through consideration based on context and 
differences. Thus, as much as the defence would be available to the woman who kills in non-
confrontational situation, it will just be as available to the accused who kills in a moment of 
rage. This approach has been recognized in some American and many Australian 
jurisdictions.229Nonetheless, the restructured approach must be limited by criminal law. Thus, 
the accused who relies on the defence must point to an existing criminal wrong and not 
merely a commonly shared moral standard. For example, the defence would not be available 
to a man who kills his lover arising from adultery because even if the act itself is morally 
reprehensible, it is not a crime in many jurisdictions.230 
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5.2 Arguments by women rights advocates and activists 
Women rights advocates, activists and legal scholars have advanced various reasons for the 
reformation of the traditional defence of provocation. The three broad heads precipitating the 
clamour for reform of the defence are briefly discussed.  
5.2.1 The defence is patriarchal 
The traditional defence of provocation has long been viewed as male-centred and subjugated 
defence. It is contended that since the doctrine was designed to control the conduct of men out 
of concern for their inherent anger, it continues to advance the same patriarchal interests. The 
defence is perceived to function as a greatly sexed excuse for men who kill to escape a 
conviction for murder231and accordingly, is of limited use to women since its criteria are 
measured against male standards of behaviour and responses.232  Although the defence is 
founded on concern for human weakness, it is really a legal masquerade for the propagation 
of male chauvinism through legitimisation of male aggression especially against women, their 
natural prey. The principal objective of the defence is to safeguard man’s sense of self-worth 
which requires unqualified control of the woman’s sexual fidelity, effort, presence, affection, 
and devotion. Where this self-esteem is threatened, he feels provoked. The defence is 
therefore, a recognition that he is entitled to retaliate in the face of such provocation.233 
 
5.2.2  The Defence lacks a moral foundation 
Critics of the traditional defence of provocation argue that the defence lacks a moral 
foundation as it conveniently elevates certain human emotions, and deliberately excludes 
others. In this case, the emotion of sudden anger or rage has been identified as a contemptible 
recipient of the exclusive right of preferential treatment in criminal law while other human 
emotions such as despondency, fear and compassion are totally disregarded. The critics also 
argue that while an array of emotions can interfere with a person’s ability to exercise his or 
her psychosomatic functions, there is no moral validation why rage alone ought to assume a 
privileged position in criminal law. Recognition of the emotion of anger as the only justifiable 
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or excusable cause for killing of another is tantamount to elevating the status of short-
tempered men over other persons of virtuous temperament. Indeed, it amounts to accentuating 
as permissible conduct where the short-tempered man kills because he was unable to control 
himself and conversely, as unacceptable conduct where a person who exercises reasonable 
restraint but eventually kills upon being overwhelmed by a more credible emotion such as 
fear. 234 This lack of well-founded moral justification renders the traditional defence of 
provocation ignorant of the context and reality of the accused woman who kills in a non-
confrontational situation. 235 It manifestly ignores the fact that men and women kill for 
different reasons and under varying contexts.236Similarly, the defence, due to this lack of a 
clear moral underpinning, is a persistent source of travesty of justice by encouraging a culture 
of focussing on the role of the deceased rather than on the accused. It presupposes that the 
deceased’s conduct is more instrumental to his or her own demise while disregarding the 
contribution of the accused. This is especially the case given that the deceased cannot be 
afforded with an opportunity to defend his position. Accordingly, the trial process can be 
quite a traumatic experience for the deceased’s dependants and relatives.237 
 
5.2.3  Other defences are not suitable 
Many women rights advocates, activists and legal scholars concur that the defence of 
provocation is a fundamental part of criminal law and it represents the most appropriate 
defence for the accused woman who kills in a non-confrontational situation.238The defence 
symbolises the inadequacies of human conduct and more so in relation to the aspect of self-
control. It recognises the fact that, in certain circumstances, an individual can be overcome by 
emotions to the extent that he or she is unable or finds it difficult to regulate his or her 
conduct.239Since the defence is associated with human affective functions or emotions, it 
represents a flexible option for the accused who upon being engulfed by intense emotions, has 
lost the power of self-control. A liberal approach to provocation therefore has the effect of 
widening the scope of rationales upon which the defence can be relied on. This would 
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ultimately capture the range of emotional dynamics which has caused the accused, and in 
particular the accused woman who has killed her passive abuser, to kill.240 This distinctive 
ability of the defence to rope in cumulative emotions is already recognised in many 
jurisdictions such as UK, Australia, and South Africa. 
By the same token, other defences, especially self-defence, have been faulted for their 
inability to adequately cater for the realities of the accused. For example, women who rely on 
the traditional defence of private defence seldom succeed because of the insurmountable 
hurdles characteristic of the defence.241Accordingly, there is consensus that although the 
defence of provocation in the traditional sense is manifest with profound shortcomings, 
abolishing it, especially in the face of the harsh regime for murder, would adversely affect the 
accused who has killed her passive abuser. 242 However, it may be necessary through 
legislative reform, to restructure the defence away from the traditional sense, so that it 
exhibits gender neutrality and accords to modern judicial thinking.243 
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5.3. Impetus of change in other jurisdictions 
5.3.1 England and Wales   
In England and Wales (United Kingdom), the law of provocation (now referred to as the 
defence of loss of control) is to be found in the Coroners and Justice Act of 2009.244The new 
partial defence to murder replaced the previous defence of provocation in the repealed s 3 of 
Homicide Act of 1957.245Under the new law, for the accused to make a successful claim, it 
must be proved that he or she lost self-control which is accompanied by a qualifying trigger, 
and that, objectively assessed; a person of the same sex and age would react similarly in the 
circumstances.246 
The new legislation differs from the abolished defence of provocation in several aspects. 
Firstly, the element of suddenness in the loss of self-control is not a requirement in the new 
defence. 247 Secondly, the new legislation requires that the loss of self-control must be 
accompanied by a qualifying trigger. This is defined as fear of serious violence from the 
deceased against the accused or any identified person248and, something said or done (or 
both)of an exceptionally severe nature that occasions the accused to have a justifiable sense of 
being seriously wronged. Under the abolished defence of provocation, fear was not regarded 
as an adequate ground for provocation. In R v Martin 249 where the defendant shot two 
intruders at his home, killing one and seriously injuring the other, it was held that a fear for 
violence was not sufficient to warrant his conduct. 
Under the Act, instances of revenge250and sexual infidelity251 that might otherwise give rise to 
claims of loss of self-control have been explicitly excluded. Under the abolished law, 
requirement of suddenness in the accused’s loss of self-control was intended to make the 
defence unavailable to one who killed out of a desire for revenge. In R v Ibrams and 
Gregory 252 the diseased, a released convict, was a source of continuous harassment and 
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248 Coroners and Justice Act (n 244 above) 55(3). 
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intimidation for the two appellants. The harassment continued even after they reported the 
matter to the police, upon which they decided to take matters into their hands. Consequently, 
they beat the deceased to death. At the trial court, they claimed they lost their control once 
they started beating him. The court was of a contrary view and they were both convicted of 
murder. On appeal the conviction was upheld as there was no sudden loss of control. By 
virtue of s 55 (6),253the new law appears to have put to rest the contention that the abolished 
defence of provocation conferred an unfair advantage on men who killed their lovers out of 
jealousness as was the case in R v Humes.254 In this case the defendant killed his wife upon 
discovering that she had been sleeping with another man. He was not put on trial as he 
pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Provocation was accepted by the trial judge and the 
prosecution and he was sentenced to 7 years. The Attorney General appealed the sentence. 
The Court of Appeal confirmed the defence of provocation and the seven-year sentence. 
S 54(1) (c) provides that ‘a person of D's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and 
self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar 
way to D.’ This is an import of the principles of provocation developed at common law. The 
application of this principle is illustrated in DPP v Camplin255where Lord Diplock held 
that‘[…] the reasonable man [...] is a person having the power of self-control to be expected 
of an ordinary person of the sex and age of the accused [...].’Similarly, in Attorney General 
for Jersey v Holley256where the accused had killed his girlfriend with an axe, it was held that 
in objectively assessing the accused’s loss of self-control, sex and age were the only relevant 
characteristics of the accused. The objective nature of the inquiry into the circumstances 
leading to the accused’s conduct was also a consistent feature in the common law defence of 
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The defence of provocation has been the subject of intense scrutiny in four of the eight 
jurisdictions in Australia.259In the mid-1990s, the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee 
(MCCOC) was established by a Standing Committee of the Attorneys-General (SCAG) for 
the purpose of developing a national model criminal code for Australian Jurisdictions. 
Consequently, the MCCOC published a Discussion Paper in June 1998.260In the discussion 
paper, the MCCOC concluded that: 
a. the partial defence of provocation was profoundly in favour of men and should be 
abolished;261 
b. matters of culpability be determined during sentencing;262 
c. owing to the nature of the doctrine, the inherent gender-bias could not be remedied 
by superficial alterations such as relaxing the requirements.263 
Subsequently, informed by the need to enhance gender balance in line with substantive 
equality principles, the State of Victoria set up the Victorian Law Reform Commission 
(VLRC) in 2001 to review the defences to homicide.264The VLRC established that, in addition 
to being unfavourable, provocation was ineffective as a defence to women.265Following its 
recommendations, the defence was abolished vide the Crimes (Homicide) Act of 2005.266The 
same position was adopted by the State of Western Australia through the Law Reform 
Commission of Western Australia (LRCWA) which was commissioned in 2006 to review and 
report on the law of homicide.267As a result, mandatory life sentence and provocation were 
abolished in Western Australia in 2008.268Another review of the defence was undertaken by 
the Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC) in 2008 against a backdrop of public 
resentment emanating from court pronouncements.269In departure from the stance taken by 
preceding commissions, the QLRC was of the view that in the face of a mandatory death 
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sentence, leniency was permissible for deserving cases. Thus it recommended for the 
retention of provocation, albeit with a reduced scope.270However, judicial intervention has 
been manifest even in jurisdictions where provocation is still applied. This has resulted in the 
refinement of the requirements thereby placating the concerns of the critics. The courts are 
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In Canada the partial defence of provocation is to be found at Article 232 of the Criminal 
Code of 1985, which provides that: 
a. Culpable homicide amounting to murder may be reduced to manslaughter if 
occasioned by sudden provocation.272 
b. A wrongful act or insult amounts to provocation if it is sufficient to deprive an 
ordinary person of the power of self-control, and if such person to whom the act or 
insult is done reacts suddenly within the short moment of passion.273 
c. Questions relating to the provocative act and whether the accused was deprived of 
the ability of self-control are questions of fact.274 
d. A legal act is not a basis for provocation.275 
e. An act by a third person on the accused that arises from the conduct of another 
person induced by the accused to incite the said third person to do the act on the 
accused, is not an excuse for provocation where the accused causes grievous bodily 
harm or death.276 
f. Where an illegal arrest on the accused results in the death of a person, prior 
knowledge by the accused of the illegality of the arrest may be used to support a 
claim of provocation.277 
Prior to the current provisions, the law was governed by the common law doctrine of 
provocation developed in the seventeenth century.278Under the current law, provocation is a 
partial defence, and a successful claim has the effect of attracting a conviction of the lesser 
charge of manslaughter as opposed to murder.  Despite the fact that the code is fairly recent, 
at a glance, the provisions of the article appear remarkably similar to those of s 207-208 of the 
Kenyan Penal Code 81 of 1948. In both jurisdictions, the purpose of provocation is to reduce 
a conviction of murder to manslaughter.279Additionally, the structure of the provisions is 
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similar280and the ingredients281and the exceptions282of the defence are more or less the same. 
However, in Canada unlike in Kenya, judicial intervention has attempted to place the law in 
line with modern judicial thinking. The active role of the courts in the development of the law 
of provocation has been witnessed in several court decisions. For example, the Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC) sought to settle the question of what constitutes ‘an ordinary person’ in the 
case of R v Hill 283  where a sixteen year old boy, who was relying on the defence of 
provocation, was convicted for murder after he fatally stabbed the deceased for making 
unsolicited homosexual advances. The court held that in gauging the accused’s conduct 
against that of an ordinary person, the trial court had erred for disregarding his age and sex. 
Accordingly, it ordered a fresh trial.284In this case, the SCC developed a two-stage test for the 
defence. The first stage entails an objective assessment of the accused’s conduct against that 
of an ordinary person in relation to provocation, while the second stage seeks to subjectively 
inquire whether the accused’s conduct was caused by sudden provocation.285The approach 
was confirmed in the subsequent case of R v Thibert286where the court held that ‘[…] this 
threshold test can be readily met, so long as there is some evidence that the objective and 
subjective elements may be satisfied. If there is, the defence must then be left with the 
jury.’287However, it seems the law of provocation in Canada in its current form is still 
problematic if the copious dissenting opinions to judicial pronouncements are anything to go 
by.288 
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CHAPTER 6  
Conclusion 
From the preceding chapters, it is evident that the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
based on provocation invariably occupies a unique position in criminal law. It is innately 
expandable and thus, capable of accommodating diverse instances where killing is prompted 
by emotional travails. It is submitted therefore, that reform, rather than abolition is preferable. 
However, in order for the defence to serve the case of the accused woman who kills in a non-
confrontational situation, it must be anchored on modern legal principles and capable of 
satisfying the test of equality before the law. The defence must therefore be founded on 
substantive equality. It must entail moving beyond mere prohibition of inequality to taking 
into account the context under which the accused kills. Likewise, the defence must not be 
shrouded in any gender / abuse-specific permutations and exclusionary clauses that are based 
on gender difference or otherwise.  
Various concerns must be addressed, it is submitted, for the realisation of such of the ideal 
defence of provocation. Firstly, the raison deter of separation of powers must come into play 
through the enactment of a well-defined codified law that is aligned to the common law 
principles. This would ensure that the law is restricted within more predictable and stable 
parameters thereby reducing unnecessary uncertainties associated with dissonant 
interpretations. The current law of provocation in England and Wales presents a good case. 
Secondly, there is need to recognise and bolster the competencies of other related institutions. 
For example, there may be a need to strengthen psychiatric functions with the aim of giving 
the courts an enhanced understanding of the varied conducts of the accused. In the case of S v 
Eadie the courts reliance on psychiatric opinion was highly evident invariably highlighting 
the important role played by other institutions in enhancing the interests of justice. Thirdly, 
the interests of justice must prevail. Accordingly, a balance must be struck between practical 
demands of the society (policy demands) and the interests of the accused (theoretical 
demands). While it is evident that some jurisdictions such as UK and Canada have accepted a 
compromise position that incorporates both subjectivism and objectivism, South African 
courts are still grappling with the question. 
Proceeding from the aforesaid, an amalgam of the current law of provocation in UK289 and 
South Africa290 is recommended to read as follows: 
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Defence of Provocation 
Section 1 
(1)Where a person who commits an act or omission which constitutes an offence and 
who at the time of such commission or omission suffers from emotional stress which 
makes him or her incapable- 
(a)  of appreciating the wrongfulness of his or her act or omission; or  
(b)  of acting in accordance with an appreciation of the wrongfulness of his or 
her act or omission, shall not be criminally responsible for such act or 
omission provided that a person of the accused’s sex and age, with a normal 
degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of the 
accused might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to the accused. 
(2)For the purposes of subsection (1), ‘emotional stress’ may relate to sudden or the 
gradual loss of self-control. 
(3)Subsection (2) applies if the accused’s loss of self-control was attributable to a thing 
or things done or said (or both) which constituted circumstances of an extremely 
grave character, and caused the accused to have a justifiable sense of being seriously 
wronged. 
(4)In establishing the circumstances in subsection (3), evidence of expert opinion may 
be adduced in addition to any other evidence which may be of relevance.  
(5)In subsection (1) (b), the reference to ‘the circumstances of the accused’ is a 
reference to all of accused’s circumstances other than those whose only relevance to 
accused’s conduct is that they bear on the accused’s general capacity for tolerance or 
self-restraint. 
(6)Subsection (1) does not apply if- 
(a) in doing or being a party to the killing, the accused acted in a considered 
desire for revenge; or 
(b) the accused’s conduct was caused by a thing which the accused incited to be 
done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence; or 
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(c)  if the accused incited the thing to be done or said for the purpose of 
providing an excuse to use violence; or 
(d) if the thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity. 
(7)On a charge of murder, if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect 
to the defence under subsection (1), it must assumed that the defence is satisfied 
unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not. 
(8)For the purposes of subsection (7), sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue 
with respect to the defence if evidence is adduced on which, in the opinion of the 
court, could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply. 
(9)The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of this section not liable to be 
convicted of murder does not affect the question whether the killing amounted to 
murder in the case of any other party to it. 
